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THE CURRENT STATE OF ANTIDILUTION LAW: THE
TRADEMARK DILUTION REVISION ACT AND
THE IDENTICAL MARK PRESUMPTION
[T]he preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should consti-
tute the only rational basis for its protection.1
INTRODUCTION
The restriction on public access is one of the main sources of ten-
sion in intellectual property law. 2 Trademarks, unlike copyrights and
patents, do not offer the mark owner a limited monopoly.3 Rather,
trademarks are protectable only where the owner uses the mark as a
source indicator in interstate commerce. 4 Trademarks do not provide
a public benefit equivalent to that of copyrights and patents.5 Fur-
thermore, an overly protective federal trademark regime may
threaten public access to words, symbols, or names. Indeed, several
authorities have questioned whether trademark law creates "barriers
to entry" into desired market segments.6
Courts and scholars have expressed further concern for trademark
dilution protection. 7 Unlike trademark infringement, trademark dilu-
tion law does not protect consumer welfare. 8 Rather, it protects the
1. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813, 831
(1927) (cited in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003)).
2. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:31
n.15 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter MCCARTHY] ("[Mlany courts will conduct a balancing test: bal-
ancing the public interest in free expression (First Amendment) against the public interest in
avoiding consumer confusion (Lanham Act)."). This Note refers to "trademarks" in the
broadest sense, including service marks, collective marks, certification marks, trade names, and
trade dress. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2000).
3. Trademark registration provides ten years of initial protection, renewable indefinitely. 15
U.S.C. § 1058 (2000). In contrast, copyright protection generally extends seventy years beyond
the author's life, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000), and patent protection is limited to twenty years from the
filing date, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(C) (2000); H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 25 (2005) ("Trademark law does
not involve typical intellectual property rights .... [T]he primary policy rationale for traditional
trademark law rests on a policy of protecting consumers from mistake and deception.").
5. Unlike other intellectual property doctrines, which derive explicitly from the Copyright and
Patent Clause of the Constitution, trademark law has no direct constitutional basis. Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). Therefore, Congress used its commerce clause powers to implement
federal trademark protection. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, 8.
6. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:12.
7. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003).
8. See 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 5A.01[2] (2007) [herein-
after GILSON] ("Proof of likelihood of confusion, the sine qua non of trademark infringement, is
not required in a dilution action.") (emphasis in original).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
goodwill of mark holders by ensuring that a "famous" mark is not
associated with a "diluting" mark, which may "blur" or "tarnish" the
famous mark's distinctiveness. 9 The Ninth Circuit characterized dilu-
tion law as coming "very close to granting 'rights in gross' in a trade-
mark." 0  Trademark dilution law creates serious public access
consequences, because the most common remedy for dilution is in-
junctive relief.1 By enacting the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
(TDRA), Congress attempted to strike a balance between the com-
peting interests of the mark owner and the public. 12
This Note argues that the TDRA made substantial strides toward a
more balanced dilution analysis for famous mark owners. Part II re-
views the doctrinal development of federal antidilution law, including
Congress's adoption of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA),
the emergence of an "identical mark presumption," and the U.S. Su-
preme Court's interpretation of dilution law in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue.13 Part III summarizes the TDRA's legislative history and
analyzes the trademark-owner-friendly and public-access-friendly pro-
visions of the Act. 14 Part IV analyzes the most important amend-
ments to federal dilution law, particularly the "likely to cause
dilution" and "general consuming public" standards, along with retro-
activity and preemption of state law. 15 Part V examines recent TDRA
cases, the continued v'tality of an identical mark presumption, and the
role of antidilution law in the overall context of trademark protec-
tion. 16 Finally, Part VI recommends how courts should interpret the
TDRA to adequately balance the interests of the mark holder and the
public. 17
II. BACKGROUND
This Part traces the origins of state and federal trademark protec-
tion and the development of state antidilution law. 18 It then discusses
9. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995).
10. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999); accord TCPIP Hold-
ing Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2000) (amended 2006).
12. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 2007).
Section 1125(c) is also referred to as section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, due to the Trademark
Act's numbering system.
13. See infra notes 18-91 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 92-168 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 169-265 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 266-315 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
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the FTDA and decisions interpreting it.19 Next, this Part reviews
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that actual dilution, rather than likely dilution, is the requisite stan-
dard of harm for injunctive relief.20 Finally, it reviews judicial reac-
tions to Moseley and the questions that Moseley left unanswered.
21
A. The Development of Trademark Dilution Law
Two main policy rationales underlie trademark protection. First,
trademark law prevents consumer confusion regarding the source or
sponsor of a good or service. 22 Second, trademark law protects the
goodwill of the mark holder, who invests time, money, and effort to
identify his mark with consumer perception of his products or ser-
vices.23 Dilution protection safeguards the famous mark holder's
goodwill, irrespective of consumer confusion. 24
Frank Schechter introduced trademark dilution theory in his 1927
Harvard Law Review article, recognizing that "the value of the mod-
ern trademark lies in its selling power. 12 5 Schechter noted that a di-
luting party's mark could cause the public to think of another's
mark.2 6 He famously characterized dilution as the "whittling away" of
distinctiveness. 27
Subsequently, several states passed antidilution statutes to supple-
ment the Lanham Act's infringement protections. 28 Two types of dilu-
19. See infra notes 34-70 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
22. Consumer confusion is the keystone to finding trademark infringement for both registered
and unregistered marks. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2000). Although approaches vary, courts
generally analyze several nonexclusive factors for consumer confusion:
(1) the strength of his mark, (2) the degree of similarity between the two marks, (3) the
proximity of the products, (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap,
(5) actual confusion, and (6) the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its
own mark, the quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers.
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). In addition to point of
purchase confusion, courts will consider "initial interest confusion" and "post-sale confusion." 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 23:6-23:7. Finally, courts also examine confusion as to sponsorship
or endorsement, in addition to source or origin confusion. Id. § 23:8.
23. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:15. See White Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys., Inc.,
90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937) ("Good will may be defined as the favorable consideration shown
by the purchasing public to goods known to emanate from a particular source.").
24. Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 628 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that dilution
law "only exists to protect the quasi-property rights a holder has in maintaining the integrity and
distinctiveness of his mark").
25. Schechter, supra note 1, at 831.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 825.
28. 3-4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 22:10, 24:77. Thirty-six states currently have antidilution
statutes. Id. § 24:77 n.1. States are hesitant to grant injunctions outside their jurisdictions, so the
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tion emerged: blurring and tarnishment. 29 On the one hand, blurring
is the use of a mark in any manner likely to cause an unintended asso-
ciation, which would reduce the famous mark's distinctiveness. 30 For
example, marks such as DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KO-
DAK pianos could blur the association with the famous mark owner
without necessarily confusing consumers.31 Tarnishment, on the other
hand, is an association that is likely to disparage a mark owner's goods
or services or tarnish the images associated with another's mark. 32
The Second Circuit stated that "[t]he sine qua non of tarnishment is a
finding that plaintiff's mark will suffer negative associations through
defendant's use."'33
B. Federal Trademark Dilution Act
Congress passed the FTDA in 1995. 34 Recognizing that the "patch-
quilt system" of state dilution protection laws encouraged forum shop-
ping, Congress sought to foster stability for famous mark owners by
providing them with nationwide injunctive relief.35 The FTDA re-
quired "commercial use in commerce," protecting parodies used in a
commercial context. 36 Additionally, the FTDA included dilution ex-
emptions for comparative advertising, the noncommercial promotion
of competing goods, and news commentaries. 37
The FTDA defined dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless
of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of
the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mis-
impact of these laws are limited. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., No. 94-CIV-2322,
1995 WL 81299 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995) (limiting the permanent injunction to New York state's
confines).
29. Additionally, the dilutive use of a protected mark in a domain name may give rise to an
actionable claim for cybersquatting, where the registrant has a bad-faith intent to profit from the
mark. Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). Cybersquatting may
also be enforced via the ICANN Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy. See http://
www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(1)(a) (1995).
31. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995); S. 1513, 104th Cong. (1995).
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(1)(b) (1995).
33. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000) (amended 2006).
35. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006).
37. § 1125(c)(4).
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take, or deception. ' 38 Although the FTDA failed to define blurring or
tarnishment, the legislative history recognized both types of dilution.
39
In order to find liability, the FTDA required that another party's
use of a similar mark dilute his mark's distinctiveness. 40 Conse-
quently, a circuit split arose concerning whether plaintiffs must
demonstrate "actual dilution" or merely a "likelihood of dilution" to
obtain injunctive relief. The First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits adopted a likely dilution standard,41 while the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits adopted an actual dilution standard. 42 Additionally,
courts embracing the likely dilution standard analyzed dilution under
various tests. For example, the Second Circuit first developed a rigid
six-factor test 43 and later provided a flexible ten-factor analysis.44 The
Third and Sixth Circuits adopted the Second Circuit's ten-factor anal-
ysis. 45 Other courts, finding several of these factors unhelpful due to
38. § 1127.
39. "The purpose of H.R. 1295 is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that
blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood
of confusion." H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006) ("The owner of a famous mark shall be
entitled ... to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark .... (emphasis added)).
41. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 537 U.S.
418 (2003); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000); Times Mirror
Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000); Nabisco, Inc. v.
PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27
(1st Cir. 1998).
42. Compare Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000)
(requiring actual dilution but not necessarily economic harm), with Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (requiring
proof of actual economic harm via lost sales or profits).
43. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989)
(Sweet, J., concurring) ("(1) similarity of the marks; (2) similarity of the products covered by the
marks; (3) sophistication of consumers; (4) predatory intent; (5) renown of the senior mark:
[and] (6) renown of the junior mark").
44. The ten-factor test included the following factors:
(a) Distinctiveness.
(b) Similarity of the marks.
(c) Proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap.
(d) Interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of the
junior mark, and the proximity of the products.
(e) Shared consumers and geographic limitations.
(f) Sophistication of consumers.
(g) Actual confusion.
(h) Adjectival or referential quality of the junior use.
(i) Harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user.
(j) Effect of the senior's prior laxity in protecting the mark.
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999).
45. See Moseley, 259 F.3d at 477; Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d at 168-69.
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overlap with trademark infringement law, simplified their blurring
tests. 46 The Seventh Circuit focused on the renown of the senior mark
and the similarity between marks.47 The Eighth Circuit looked to the
similarities between marks and whether consumers identify the defen-
dant's product with the plaintiff's famous mark.48 Thus, each circuit
focused on the similarity between marks.
Additionally, several courts looked for identity-or at least substan-
tial similarity-between marks.49 For example, defendant's LEXUS
mark was not sufficiently identical to plaintiff's LEXIS mark to war-
rant dilution protection. 50 This close identity prerequisite continues
today, as demonstrated by Moseley and recent TDRA cases.51
In addition to creating confusion over proof of dilution, Congress
failed to articulate a clear standard for determining when a mark is
famous.52 Although the FTDA provided eight factors for considera-
tion,53 courts split on the amount of fame necessary for dilution pro-
tection. In Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News,
L.L. C., the Third Circuit applied the fame factors within a "niche mar-
ket," finding that THE SPORTING NEWS was sufficiently famous
within its target market.54 Niche fame may result from fame in a geo-
graphic area or within a particular line of products or services.55 Cir-
cuits that adopted a niche fame standard generally found that "a mark
not famous to the general public is nevertheless entitled to protection
from dilution where both the plaintiff and defendant are operating in
the same or related markets, so long as the plaintiff's mark possesses a
high degree of fame in its niche market. ' 56 The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits adopted the Third Circuit's fame stan-
46. See, e.g., Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 804-05 (6th Cir. 2004).
47. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2000).
48. Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832-33 (8th Cir. 1999).
49. The Ninth Circuit required that an accused diluter's mark be "identical or nearly identi-
cal" to plaintiff's mark for dilution protection to apply. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d
796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002).
50. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales. Inc.. 875 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1989):
see also Luigino's, Inc., 170 F.3d at 832 (finding that LEAN CUISINE and LEAN N' TASTY
were not sufficiently similar).
51. See infra notes 295-300 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006).
54. 212 F.2d 157. 165 (3d Cir. 2000).
55. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:105. Courts that have applied niche fame relied prima-
rily on "the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade" factor
in the FTDA fame analysis. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(F) (2000) (amended 2006).
56. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.2d at 164.
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dard.57 Although it accepted niche fame, the Ninth Circuit reserved
protection for "truly prominent and renowned" 58 marks with a
"household name." 59
In contrast, the First and Second Circuit adopted a "general public"
fame standard.60 In TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications,
Inc., the court implemented a general public fame standard to find
that the plaintiff's THE CHILDREN'S PLACE mark was not suffi-
ciently famous or distinctive to warrant dilution protection. 61 General
public fame, unlike niche fame, requires sufficient fame across a "sig-
nificant percentage" of the general consuming public. 62 Many com-
mentators supported a general public fame standard, stating that
niche fame would swallow infringement, contrary to congressional
intent.63
Despite circuit splits concerning the level of dilution and fame,
courts generally interpreted the FTDA through a five-element test,
requiring that the plaintiff show the following: (1) its mark is famous;
(2) its mark is distinctive; (3) the defendant is making commercial use
of its mark in commerce; (4) the defendant's use of its mark came
after the plaintiff's mark became famous; and (5) the defendant's use
of its mark dilutes the distinctiveness of the plaintiff's mark.64 Some
courts applied a four-factor test, collapsing fame and distinctiveness
into a single requirement. 65 Thus, based on the FTDA language
"whether a mark is distinctive and famous," another split arose as to
whether distinctiveness and fame are two separate requirements. 66
57. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004);
Thane Int'l v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v.
Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 238 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2001); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d at
165; Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
58. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999).
59. Thane Int'l, Inc., 305 F.3d 894, at 911.
60. See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2001); I.P.
Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 45-47 (1st Cir. 1998).
61. 244 F.3d at 98-99.
62. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:105.
63. See Heidi L. Belongia, Comment, Why Is Fame Still Confusing? Misuse of the "Niche
Market Theory" Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 1159, 1159-60
(2002).
64. See Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 577 (6th Cir. 2000).
65. The four-prong test was articulated in Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316.
1324 (9th Cir. 1998).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (amended 2006) (emphasis added). Distinctiveness measures a
mark's ability to distinguish a party's goods or services. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992). Suggestive and arbitrary marks, such as KODAK film, are immedi-
ately eligible for trademark protection, because they are inherently distinctive. Id. at 768. De-
scriptive marks, such as BLUE RIBBON, must acquire distinctiveness by establishing a
secondary meaning. Id. at 769.
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The First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits held that fame and distinc-
tiveness are distinct requirements,67 while the Third and Ninth Cir-
cuits treated them as one requirement. 68 Finally, the Second Circuit
developed a minority view that, in the dilution context, distinctiveness
refers specifically to inherent distinctiveness. 69 Meanwhile, the Third
and Ninth Circuits declared that either inherent or acquired distinc-
tiveness would suffice. 70
C. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue
In Moseley, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the circuit split
concerning whether the actual dilution or the likely dilution standard
is appropriate for injunctive relief.71 The Moseley Court considered
whether the defendant lingerie store owner's use of VICTOR'S LIT-
TLE SECRET to describe his lingerie and novelty business diluted
the plaintiff's VICTORIA'S SECRET mark. 72 Although the lower
courts found in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court reversed. 73
The Court held that the FTDA required proof of actual dilution, not
merely likely dilution. 74 The Court reasoned that mere mental associ-
ation did not necessarily result in dilution. 75 Although it did not re-
quire economic harm, the Court implied that data, such as consumer
survey results, could serve as circumstantial evidence of actual dilu-
tion.76 The Court also added fuel to the "identical mark presumption"
67. See Advantage Rent-A-Car. Inc. v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 238 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2001); V
Secret Catalogue. Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 469-70 (6th Cir. 2001); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc.. 191 F.3d 208, 216 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999): TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns. Inc.,
244 F.3d 88, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2001).
68. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir.
2000): Panavision Int'l, L.P., 141 F.3d at 1324.
69. TCPIP Holding Co.. 244 F.3d 88. 100 (2d Cir. 2001) (enumerating two inquiries for distinc-
tiveness: (1) whether plaintiff's mark achieved a sufficient degree of acquired distinctiveness to
warrant fame: and (2) whether the mark possesses a sufficient degree of inherent
distinctiveness).
70. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc.. 212 F.3d at 157: Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton. 189
F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999). The FTDA's legislative history supported both inherent and acquired
distinctiveness. H.R. REI,. No. 104-374, at 7 (1995).
71. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
72 Id. at 423.
73. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525. at *6 (W.D. Ky.
Feb. 9, 2000) (holding in favor of the plaintiff based on dilution by tarnishment), aff'd, 259 F.3d
464. 476-77 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming after finding dilution by tarnishment and blurring), rev'd,
537 U.S. 418 (2003).
74. Moseley. 537 U.S. at 433 ("This text unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution,
rather than a likelihood of dilution.").
75. Id. at 434. ("'Blurring' is not a necessary consequence of mental association. (Nor, for
that matter, is 'tarnishing.')").
76. Id.
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fire by stating that, where a junior mark and senior mark are identical,
no further proof of actual dilution may be necessary. 77 In his concur-
rence, Justice Kennedy left open the possibility that actual dilution
may not necessarily require an impact on present power, suggesting
that an impact on potential power may suffice. 78
D. Post-Moseley Reaction
Moseley frustrated the FTDA's goals and left many questions unan-
swered. The Court failed to articulate a clear standard for determin-
ing when a plaintiff has proven actual dilution.7 9 Additionally, the
Court questioned whether tarnishment was an actionable claim under
the FTDA, stating that state antidilution laws differed substantially
from the FTDA.80 These dicta called into question the comprehen-
siveness of federal antidilution law and prompted Congress to amend
the FTDA.8' Nevertheless, several courts continued to recognize dilu-
tion by tarnishment as actionable under the FTDA.82
Although courts uniformly adopted an actual dilution standard
post-Moseley, some distinguished their more plaintiff-friendly state di-
lution laws. For example, the Second Circuit found that New York's
likely dilution standard remained good law, despite Moseley's actual
dilution dictate for federal relief.8 3 In Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, the
Second Circuit addressed Moseley's implication that a plaintiff could
establish actual dilution by proving commercial use of an identical
mark. 84 Following Moseley, several courts considered the use of an
identical mark to be per se evidence of actual dilution.8 5 Savin held
77. Id. ("It may well be, however, that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys
will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence-
the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical.").
78. Id. at 435-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "capacity" could refer to present or
potential power of a famous mark).
79. See Kathleen Goodberlet, Note, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006: Prospec-
tive Changes to Dilution Definition, Claim Analyses, and Standard of Harm, 6 J. HIGH TECH. L.
249 (2006).
80. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432.
81. See Goodberlet, supra note 79.
82. See AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786. 801 (6th Cir. 2004): cf. Starbucks Corp.
v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., No. 01-Civ.-5981, 2005 WL 3527126, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23,
2005) (questioning whether tarnishment was within the scope of federal antidilution law, but
reaffirming its inclusion in New York's antidilution law).
83. Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 456 (2d Cir. 2004) see also Nissan Motor Co. v.
Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004) (contrasting California's likely dilu-
tion standard).
84. 391 F.3d at 450.
85. See, e.g., Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Pro-Line Protoform, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1081. 1085 (C.D.
Cal. 2004).
579
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that, "where a plaintiff who owns a famous senior mark can show the
commercial use of an identical junior mark, such a showing constitutes
circumstantial evidence of the actual-dilution element of an FTDA
claim."'86 In Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., the Seventh Circuit considered
whether the BEANIES mark owner had proven actual dilution.87
Judge Posner questioned the Moseley identical mark presumption and
opined that no consumer survey could satisfy an actual dilution bur-
den.88 Although some courts phrased the presumption as "per se evi-
dence" and other courts phrased it as "circumstantial evidence," the
bottom line was that a plaintiff would not succeed under federal dilu-
tion law if his mark was not closely identified with his accused dilu-
ter's mark.
The Moseley Court also failed to resolve the circuit split regarding
the fame and distinctiveness requirements. Most courts held that,
consistent with the distinctiveness requirement for infringement, ei-
ther inherent or acquired distinctiveness would suffice for IFTDA pro-
tection. 89 In Savin, the court applied the Second Circuit's minority
distinctiveness test, requiring both inherent and acquired distinctive-
ness.90 Courts also continued to dispute the proper scope of the
"fame" requirement, although they trended toward a general public
standard.91
III. TRADEMARK DILUTION REVISION ACT OF 2006
Many courts and practitioners reacted negatively to Moseley's find-
ings. Consequently, Congress proposed amendments to the FTDA
that would clarify the scope of the Act and create a likely dilution
standard of harm.92 The TDRA substantially altered the antidilution
law landscape. This Part summarizes the TDRA's legislative history
and analyzes the trademark-owner-friendly and public-access-friendly
provisions of the Act.93
86. Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 452 (emphasis in original). "[A] mere similarity in the marks-
even a close similarity-will not suffice to establish per se evidence of actual dilution." Id. at
453.
87. 353 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that BEANIE BABIES was not sufficiently
identical to SCREENIE BABIES).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Herman Miller. Inc. v. A. Studio S.R.L., No. 1:04-CV-781, 2006 WL 2456218, at
*6 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2006).
90. Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 449.
91. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Autovation Techs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 763 (E.D.
Mich. 2004); but see 800-JR CIGAR, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2006)
(finding fame in niche market).
92. See H.R. REP. No. 109-23 (2005).
93. See infra notes 94-168 and accompanying text.
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A. Legislative History
Congress introduced the TDRA in February 2005.94 During the
House Judiciary Committee debates, International Trademark Associ-
ation (INTA) representatives criticized Moseley's actual dilution stan-
dard.95 The Committee also heard testimony from industry groups
regarding the fame and distinctiveness requirements. 96 The amend-
ments embraced a "likely to cause dilution" standard of harm and
adopted a "general consuming public" standard for determining
fame.97 Further, Congress clarified the scope of antidilution law by
creating separate causes of action for blurring and tarnishment. 98 The
President signed the TDRA into law on October 6, 2006.99
B. Favorable Amendments for Trademark Owners
The TDRA resolved many vexing issues resulting from FTDA in-
terpretations and Moseley. Several TDRA amendments should in-
crease a mark holder's likelihood of receiving injunctive relief.
Specifically, key changes favoring mark holders include the following:
(1) a likely dilution standard of proof; (2) inherent or acquired distinc-
tiveness for a famous mark; (3) a clearly defined cause of action for
dilution by tarnishment; and (4) dilution protection for famous, non-
functional trade dress. 100
1. Likely Dilution Standard of Harm
In response to Moseley, Congress established a new dilution stan-
dard.' 0 The TDRA replaced the ambiguous FTDA language, "causes
dilution,"102 with a likely dilution standard:
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that
is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be
entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time
after the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of a
mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless
94. H.R. Res. 683, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted).
95. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement
of Anne Gundelfinger on behalf of INTA).
96. Id. at 7-31.
97. H.R. REP. No. 109-23 (2005).
98. id.
99. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), (c)(2)(C), (c)(4) (Supp. 2007).
101. § 1125(c)(1).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006).
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of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competi-
tion, or of actual economic injury. 103
Congress enacted the new provision, because it believed that proving
actual dilution is unnecessary.' 0 4 The new standard also repudiated
the Fourth Circuit's holding in Ringling Bros. -Barnum & Bailey Com-
bined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development, which re-
quired a showing of actual dilution via proof of actual economic
loss.1 0 5  Under the TDRA, plaintiffs can bring successful dilution
claims without proving actual economic injury. 10 6
The likely dilution standard is consistent with state antidilution laws
and the FTDA's legislative history. It requires a lower burden of
proof for plaintiffs and should lead to a higher likelihood of success in
federal claims. 1"7 Finally, the new standard for demonstrating dilution
is consistent with trademark infringement law, which requires a likeli-
hood of consumer confusion.10 8
2. Independent Showing of Either Acquired or Inherent
Distinctiveness
The TDRA resolved the circuit split regarding distinctiveness, de-
claring that distinctiveness may be satisfied via either acquired or in-
herent distinctiveness. 10 9  Congress also clarified the role of
distinctiveness in dilution analysis. Under the FTDA, courts consid-
ered eight factors indicating whether a mark is "distinctive and fa-
mous."110 The first factor was "the degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of the mark.""' Consequently, some courts applied
fame and distinctiveness as one requirement.1 12
Congress removed distinctiveness from the fame analysis."13 This
confirms that fame and distinctiveness are indeed two separate re-
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
104. H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 3 (2005).
105. 170 F.3d 449. 461 (4th Cir. 1999).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 2007) ("regardless of ... economic injury").
107. In Eli Lilly Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456. 468 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that actual dilution would leave mark owners without an adequate remedy,
stating that diminished revenue is difficult to show and that customer surveys are expensive,
time-consuming, and subject to manipulation. Id. The TDRA avoids these cumbersome actual
dilution requirements.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1 114(1)(a) (2000) ("likely to cause confusion").
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 2007) ("[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive,
inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction .
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006).
111. § 1125(c)(1)(A).
112. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2007).
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quirements, which is consistent with case lav and legal authority. 1 4
Although the Second Circuit doubted that a mark lacking inherent
distinctiveness could be sufficiently famous for dilution, Congress de-
termined that marks with acquired distinctiveness are eligible for dilu-
tion protection.11 5  The acquired or inherent distinctiveness
requirement is consistent with trademark infringement analysis."16
The amount of proof necessary to show distinctiveness is "not suffi-
cient to demonstrate fame in a dilution case. 11 7 Thus, the stronger
"general consuming public" fame requirement should alleviate con-
cern over dilution protection for marks with acquired
distinctiveness.] 18
3. Dilution by Tarnishment
Furthermore, the TDRA formally recognized a cause of action for
dilution by tarnishment." 9 Congress also eliminated the general defi-
nition of trademark dilution and created new definitions for each
cause of action.12 0 It defined tarnishment as an "association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that harms the reputation of the famous mark."' 2' Although the
FTDA's legislative history mentioned tarnishment, the Act itself
failed to explicitly embrace the term.1 22 Congress rejected Justice Ste-
vens's suggestion in Moseley that federal dilution protection may be
narrower than state antidilution law, precluding tarnishment as a
claim. 23 Rather, Congress clearly intended to implement both blur-
ring and tarnishment causes of action and thus expressly added
tarnishment to the TDRA. 24
After Moseley, some courts opined that the FTDA was limited to
dilution by blurring claims. 125 The TDRA's clear support for dilution
by tarnishment aids famous mark holders, because damage to a mark
owner's reputation is easier to demonstrate than a blurred associa-
114. 2 GILSON, supra note 8, § 5A.01[4][b].
115. H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 9 (2005).
116. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
117. 2 GILSON, supra note 8, § 5A.01[4][b].
118. See infra notes 224-244 and accompanying text.
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 2007).
120. § 1125(c)(2)(B)-(C) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
121. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
122. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003).
123. See id.
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 2007).
125. See, e.g., Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 489 n.8 (5th Cir. 2004).
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tion.126 Thus, finders of fact should recognize tarnishment more easily
than blurring. 27 The enhanced fair use defense should alleviate con-
cern that tarnishment might chill expressive speech, such as "gripe
sites."128
4. Trade Dress Dilution
Although the FTDA did not specifically address trade dress, several
courts recognized that trade dress could be diluted. 29 While some
courts expressed doubt that trade dress was within the scope of an-
tidilution law, 130 the TDRA firmly established that trade dress was
eligible for dilution protection. 131 Moreover, the plaintiff bears the
burden of showing that the claimed trade dress is not only famous, but
also nonfunctional. 32 Additionally, if a portion of the claimed trade
dress is a registered mark, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the un-
registered material is famous apart from the registered component. 133
These requirements should preserve dilution protection for famous
trade dress owners, while preventing expansive application for less-
distinctive trade dress.' 34
126. However, if the accused diluter parodies a mark, dilution by tarnishment is more likely to
be met with a First Amendment defense than dilution by blurring. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note
2, § 24:90.
127. Dilution by tarnishment is arguably easier for an individual judge or juror to identify.
Blurring, on the other hand, often requires a critical mass beyond the mere association of one
potential consumer.
128. See Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of "Trademark Use," 39
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 371 (2006). Gripe sites allow disgruntled customers to post comments about
their experiences with a particular vendor. Several courts have found these sites to be protected
speech based on the criticism and parody doctrines. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp.
v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding that a "Bally sucks" web page was pro-
tected speech and did not cause consumer confusion as to source). However, there are two
mechanisms by which mark holders can bring suit against these site holders, and a lower thresh-
old for dilution may increase litigation. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Binney & Smith v. Rose Art Indus., No. CIV.-A.-00-2939, 2001 WL 910943
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2001) (holding that CRAYOLA trade dress was sufficiently famous and non-
functional to warrant dilution protection); cf I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27
(1st Cir. 1998) (holding that KOHLER faucet design was not sufficiently famous to warrant
dilution protection).
130. See Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 1999)
(stating that it could not "say that the contention that the statute is inapplicable to trade dress is
totally without merit").
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (Supp. 2007).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Additionally, injunctive relief remains the core remedy for dilution. § 1125(c)(5). Dam-
ages are not awarded absent a showing of willful intent to trade on a mark's recognition or to
harm a famous mark's reputation. § 1125(c)(5)(B). The TDRA also provides that validly regis-
tering a mark completely bars a trademark dilution action. § 1125(c)(6).
2008] THE CURRENT STATE OF ANTIDILUTION LAW 585
C. Favorable Amendments for Public Access
Although Congress provided substantial protection for mark hold-
ers, the TDRA also includes several amendments supporting the pub-
lic's interest in free access. Provisions that should adequately balance
the public's interest with that of the famous mark owner include (1) a
general public fame standard, (2) a multi-factor determination of dilu-
tion by blurring, and (3) expanded fair use protections. 135
1. General Public Fame Standard Rather Than Niche Market Fame
The appropriate standard of fame is one of the greatest sources of
controversy in federal dilution law. 136 The FTDA did not clearly state
the appropriate standard for fame, leading several courts to apply a
niche market approach.137 Considerations of the geographic extent of
the trading area, channels of trade, and degree of recognition in the
trading areas and channels supported a niche market standard. 138 The
Moseley Court failed to analyze the appropriate fame standard for the
VICTORIA'S SECRET mark, because the parties conceded that the
mark was sufficiently famous. 139 This ambiguity sparked extensive ac-
ademic debate regarding the appropriate fame standard. 40
The TDRA formally adopted the position that a famous mark must
be sufficiently famous to the general public, rather than a niche mar-
ket.' 4' It provides that "a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by
the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of
source."' l4 2 The TDRA also consolidated the eight FTDA fame fac-
tors into four factors:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and
publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the
owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or
services offered under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
135. § 1125(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B), (c)(3).
136. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 7 (1988) ("The provision is specifically intended to address a
narrow category of famous registered trademarks where the unauthorized use by others, on dis-
similar products for which the trademark is not registered, dilutes the distinctiveness of the fa-
mous work.").
137. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006).
139. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 419 (2003).
140. See, e.g., Belongia, supra note 63.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (Supp. 2007).
142. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.1 43
Congress created the four-factor analysis to strongly discourage use of
the niche fame standard. 144 Congress removed the factors that sup-
ported the niche fame standard and eliminated the inherent or ac-
quired distinctiveness factor. 145
2. Dilution by Blurring
The FFDA failed to define blurring, instead relying on the general
definition of dilution. 146 The TDRA defines dilution by blurring as an
''association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name
and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous
mark. ' 147 The TDRA provides a non-exhaustive list of six factors for
consideration:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous
mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging
in substantially exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create
an association with the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark. 148
Although blurring can be difficult to conceptualize, courts need fur-
ther direction on how to objectively apply it.149 Additionally, Mose-
ley's observation that mere mental association is insufficient for
blurring likely remains good law.150
3. Exemptions from Dilution Liability
Finally, the TDRA enumerated a series of exclusions from federal
dilution claims.151 The TDRA incorporated each of the three de-
fenses from the FTDA and expanded the scope of the fair use defense:
143. § 1125(c)(2).
144. H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 25 (2005).
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2007).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (amended 2006).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 2007).
148. Id.
149. Several courts have expressed skepticism about finding dilution by blurring, because the
injury is subtler than an injury via tarnishment. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:120.
150. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (Supp. 2007).
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(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person
other than as a designation of source for the person's own goods or
services, including use in connection with-
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to com-
pare goods or services; or
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon
the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous
mark owner.
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.' 52
During the congressional hearings, the ACLU and others expressed
concern over the TDRA's newly proposed standards, particularly the
likely dilution and tarnishment amendments. 153 Senators Orrin Hatch
and Patrick Leahy sought to include safeguards protecting First
Amendment freedom of expression. 154 The FFDA provided exclu-
sions for comparative advertising, noncommercial uses, and news re-
porting.155 The TDRA retained these defenses and significantly
expanded them.156
First, Congress added fair use protection for nominative and de-
scriptive uses.t 57 In addition to comparative advertising, the fair use
provision now includes parody, criticism, and commentary on the
mark owner or his goods. 158 In the dilution context, a nominative fair
use occurs when a defendant uses a plaintiff's trademark to describe
the plaintiff's goods or services.a59 For example, a former Playmate's
use of the phrase "Playmate of the Year" to truthfully describe herself
was a nominative fair use, because she could not reference the trade-
marked term with a descriptive substitute.160 The extensive fair use
exemption should balance the public's interest with the likely dilution
152. Id. The FrDA and the TDRA both protect news reporting and comparative advertising
uses. Antidilution law does not reach noncommercial uses because of the interstate commerce
requirement for trademark protection.
153. H.R. REP. No. 109-23 (2005).
154. 152 CONG. REC. S1923 (2006).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000) (amended 2006).
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (Supp. 2007).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002).
160. Id. The traditional "descriptive" fair use defense, set forth in section 33(b)(4) of the
Lanham Act, is relevant for comparative advertising purposes. The TDRA provides a dilution
liability exemption where a defendant uses a plaintiff's trademark to describe the defendant's
own product or service, and the use is for comparative advertising or promotion. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(3)(A) (Supp. 2007).
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standard of harm.1 61 Furthermore, protection of parody and criticism
should alleviate concern over the tarnishment cause of action.
Additionally, the FTDA required that, to receive an injunction, a
party's diluting use be a "commercial use in commerce."1 62 In Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., the Ninth Circuit interpreted this require-
ment to mean use of a famous and distinctive mark "to sell goods
other than those produced or authorized by the mark's owner."1 63 In
contrast, the court found that the "noncommercial use" exemption re-
ferred to "a use that consists entirely of noncommercial, or fully con-
stitutionally protected, speech." 164 Congress removed the perplexing
"commercial use in commerce" language, but retained the exemption
for noncommercial uses.1 65
Finally, although the TDRA substantially increased the list of ex-
emptions, fair uses are not exempt from liability if the accused diluter
uses a mark as a "designation of source" for his own goods or ser-
vices. 166 This is not necessarily a new concept; courts have long con-
sidered whether a junior user utilized his mark or trade name in a
"trademark sense" to blur a senior user's mark. 167 Thus, if an accused
diluter merely uses a mark in a descriptive manner, there is no dilu-
tion, because consumers will not associate that mark with the source
of the defendant's product. 68
IV. ANALYSIS
To establish a prima facie case of trademark dilution by blurring or
tarnishment, courts should follow this five-factor test: (1) the plain-
tiff's mark must be famous to a significant portion of the general con-
suming public; (2) the plaintiff's mark must have inherent or acquired
distinctiveness; (3) the defendant's mark must be used in commerce;
(4) the defendant's use of his mark must have begun after the plain-
tiff's mark became famous; and (5) the defendant's mark must be
likely to cause dilution to the plaintiff's mark through blurring or
161. 152 CONG. REC. S1922-23 (2006).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006) ("another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name").
163. 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002).
164. Id. at 905.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (Supp. 2007).
166. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
167. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Commercial
use under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires the defendant to be using the trademark
as a trademark, capitalizing on its trademark status."). A recent TDRA case recognized this
lineage and required proof of use as a trademark. Jarritos, Inc. v. Los Jarritos, No. C-05-02380-
JSW, 2007 WL 1302506, at *18 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2007).
168. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:122.
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tarnishment.1 69 The TDRA explicitly sets forth several of these re-
quirements, including distinctiveness, use in commerce, and use after
the acquisition of fame.170 The likely dilution and general public fame
requirements, on the other hand, are new requirements; thus, courts
may vary in applying these factors. 17' Additionally, the TDRA does
not necessarily preempt state law causes of action. Therefore, plain-
tiffs may have recourse under state law when they cannot meet the
new, stringent requirements. 72
This Part analyzes select issues that the TDRA failed to resolve.
Although the Act embraced a likely dilution standard of harm and a
general public fame requirement, 73 these provisions are ripe for judi-
cial interpretation. Section A analyzes the likely dilution standard
and the factors that courts consider in granting injunctive relief for
both blurring and tarnishment.174 Section B reviews the general pub-
lic fame standard to determine if the new factors limit protection to
unique marks.1 75 Finally, Sections C and D explore two relevant is-
sues for mark owners: the preemption of state dilution law and the
TDRA's retroactivity. 176
A. Likely Dilution Analysis
The TDRA adopted a "likely to cause dilution" standard of harm,
but it remains to be seen what evidence courts will require to satisfy
this burden. Prior to Moseley, several circuits required a showing of
likely dilution, but the factors they considered varied substantially. 77
After Moseley, mere mental association did not necessarily reduce the
capacity of a mark to identify goods, while proof of actual economic
169. This test is consistent with the Sixth Circuit approach in Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209
F.3d 562, 577 (6th Cir. 2000). However, recent Ninth Circuit cases have not included a separate
distinctiveness requirement. See Jarritos, Inc. v. Los Jarritos, No. C-05-02380-JSW, 2007 WL
1302506, at *17 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2007); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Fox Hollow Apparel Group,
L.L.C., No. C-06-3765-SC, 2007 WL 1140648, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007). In addition to
these five factors, courts should ensure that the defendant is using a mark as a designation of
source. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:99.
170. However, some courts continue to misinterpret antidilution law to require either fame or
distinctiveness, even though these are intended to be separate requirements. See Software Pub-
lishers Ass'n v. Scott & Scott, L.L.P., No. 3:06-CV-0949-G, 2007 WL 92391, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
11, 2007) (requiring that a plaintiffs mark be "famous or distinctive") (emphasis added).
171. See infra notes 273-294 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 245-257 and accompanying text.
173. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 2007).
174. See infra notes 177-223 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 224-244 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 245-265 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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harm was unnecessary. 178 Courts will struggle to find likely dilution
between these two extremes.
1. Likely Dilution by Blurring
A plaintiff, such as Victoria's Secret, would be much more likely to
succeed on its dilution claim based on a likely dilution standard.179 In
Moseley, Justice Stevens opined that, when a plaintiff can show that a
defendant used an identical junior mark, such a showing constitutes
circumstantial evidence of actual dilution. 180 Although the TDRA's
"likely to cause dilution" standard overruled much of Moseley's analy-
sis, courts will probably continue following the "identical mark pre-
sumption," given the heavy focus on similarity between marks.18 1
Although some courts have questioned the logic of this exception,
many have used it to find actual dilution. For instance, the Sixth Cir-
cuit applied the presumption, finding actual dilution absent any proof
that the defendant made sales or profited from his use of the plain-
tiff's famous AUDI mark. 182
However, courts should strictly enforce the use of the identical
mark presumption. 183 In Savin, the Second Circuit reiterated that a
close similarity is insufficient to establish per se evidence of dilu-
tion.' 8 4 The court stressed that strict enforcement of the exception is
consistent with the federal antidilution law's purpose and narrow ap-
plication of dilution law generally. 85 Also, the Savin court approved
an approach that considered the overall context of a mark's use, in-
cluding textual, graphic, and media-specific elements. 186 A context-
driven analysis should ensure strict enforcement of the identical mark
presumption.
In addition to reliance on pre-TDRA tests and the Moseley identi-
cal mark presumption, courts will depend heavily on the six new dilu-
178. Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 453 (2d Cir. 2004).
179. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). The Court would analyze
the entire context of these marks, including the fonts and colors used. Although the terms are
quite similar and the names sound alike, a court should determine whether the overall context of
the use is likely to cause dilution by blurring. For tarnishment, Victoria's Secret could argue that
Moseley's goods were inferior in quality.
180. Id. at 434.
181. See, e.g., Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 453 (interpreting the Moseley mark identity dicta as
creating a "presumption of actual dilution").
182. See Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2006).
183. Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 453.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 453-54.
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tion by blurring factors. 187 The TDRA factors borrow heavily from
state antidilution law and should ensure narrow application of the
blurring cause of action. 188
The first TDRA factor is the "degree of similarity between the
mark or trade name and the famous mark." 189 This factor is consis-
tent with the Second and Seventh Circuit likely dilution tests, al-
though it overlaps with infringement likelihood of confusion
analysis. 190 The identical mark presumption is also critical, because, if
a plaintiff shows that a defendant's mark is identical, courts might not
require evidence of the remaining five factors. Therefore, this factor
may become the most critical in the blurring analysis.
The second factor is the "degree of inherent or acquired distinctive-
ness of the famous mark."191 Although famous marks with acquired
distinctiveness are eligible for dilution protection, courts may find that
inherently distinctive marks are more susceptible to blurring than de-
scriptive marks that only recently acquired secondary meanings. 192
Courts have found that a mark must have "a distinctive quality for a
significant percentage of the defendant's market. '193
The third factor is the "extent to which the owner of the famous
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark."'1 94
Courts should be less willing to find blurring where consumers associ-
ate a famous mark with various sources. 195 The fourth factor is the
"degree of recognition of the famous mark."' 96 It mirrors the "re-
nown" factors used by several appellate courts and should ensure con-
servative application of the blurring cause of action. 197 This factor is
analogous to the "strength of the mark" in trademark infringement
analysis.' 98
The fifth factor is "[w]hether the user of the mark or trade name
intended to create an association with the famous mark."' 99 Although
courts need not find intent for trademark dilution, this factor looks to
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 2007).
188. Id. The six factors are meant to be illustrative; thus, courts may resort to other
considerations.
189. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i).
190. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2007).
192. See Goodberlet, supra note 79, at 275.
193. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2007).
195. Goodberlet, supra note 79, at 276.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. 2007).
197. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(v) (Supp. 2007).
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the defendant's willful intent or bad faith. 200  A finding of intent to
create an association could give rise to remedies beyond injunctive
relief.201  Finally, the sixth factor considers "[a]ny actual association
between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. '20 2 Parties
may satisfy this factor with consumer surveys or expert testimony.
20 3
Therefore, courts should weigh all six factors, along with other rele-
vant considerations, to determine if a defendant's mark is likely to
cause dilution by blurring. It remains to be seen whether courts will
weigh these factors evenly or whether one factor, such as the degree
of similarity, will prove more probative than the others. An additional
concern with the TDRA factors is their substantial overlap with a like-
lihood of confusion analysis. 20 4  In trademark litigation, plaintiffs
often present infringement, dilution, and state law unfair competition
counts together.20 5 Because injunctive relief is the common remedy
for both infringement and dilution, courts can exercise discretion in
deciding which cause of action is most appropriate for relief.20
6
In addition to the six TDRA factors, courts should consider evi-
dence such as expert testimony or consumer surveys. 20 7 If courts ac-
cept expert testimony to satisfy the likely dilution standard, plaintiffs
should enjoy much success. Surveys may assist in determining the de-
gree of recognition for a famous mark and any actual association be-
tween a famous mark and a defendant's mark.208 A consumer survey
alone should not satisfy likely dilution, unless it is conducted accord-
ing to generally accepted statistical principles. 20 9
200. Trademark infringement and dilution are strict liability causes of action. -See
§ 1125(c)(5). Although intent was usually only relevant regarding damages, the TDRA includes
intent as a factor for consideration in blurring claims. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(v).
201. § 1125(c)(5).
202. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(vi).
203. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
204. The blurring analysis factors of degree of similarity between the marks, degree of recog-
nition, defendant's intent to create an association, and actual association in the dilution are anal-
ogous to the infringement analysis factors of degree of similarity between the marks, strength of
the mark, defendant's good faith, and actual confusion. See supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
205. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2006)
(analyzing claims of trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition under
federal and state law).
206. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5) (Supp. 2007); 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (2000).
207. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:68.
208. Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-1468-GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 609864, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007).
209. Id. at *5 (denying summary judgment where plaintiffs survey was flawed, because it was
not directed to the general consuming public).
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2. Likely Dilution by Tarnishment
Despite dicta in Moseley, the TDRA articulated a dilution by
tarnishment cause of action.210 The tarnishment provision, unlike the
blurring provision, does not include a list of factors for considera-
tion.2 1 Rather, the TDRA simply defines tarnishment as an "associa-
tion arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a
famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark. '2 12 His-
torically, courts have found tarnishment where a defendant uses a
plaintiff's famous mark in a degrading context or on an inferior prod-
uct, because this creates a negative association. 213 For example, a
court found that a defendant's use of the slogan "Enjoy Cocaine" tar-
nished the goodwill of the famous COCA-COLA mark.214
Courts have refused to find dilution by tarnishment where a defen-
dant's mark is of similar quality or reputation to the plaintiff's
mark,215 but have expanded tarnishment to include uses that alter a
plaintiff's famous mark, even in the absence of disparagement.216
Therefore, courts should require plaintiffs to show that a defendant's
degrading use or alteration would likely cause harm to its reputa-
tion.217 Absent degradation, plaintiffs may resort to trademark in-
fringement actions based on consumer confusion.
In tarnishment cases, defendants often assert parody defenses sup-
ported by the First Amendment. 21 8 The TDRA's fair use and non-
commercial use exemptions protect noncommercial editorials and
artistic parodies from dilution liability.21 9 Parodies, especially harm-
less puns, are unlikely to diminish the distinctiveness of a famous
mark holder. For example, in Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson
Productions Inc., the Second Circuit held that Henson's "Sp'am" pup-
pet was Pot likely to tarnish the reputation of Hormel's SPAM
mark.220
210. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 2007).
211. Compare § 1125(c)(2)(B), with § 1125(c)(2)(C).
212. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
213. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc. 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
214. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
215. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (C.D. Ill. 2003)
(declining to find dilution by tarnishment where defendant's George 2 movie featured plaintiff's
tractor but did not suggest that the products were of low quality).
216. See Deere, 41 F.3d at 45.
217. The first court to apply the TDRA used this approach. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute
Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 464 F. Supp. 2d 495, 505 (E.D. Va. 2006).
218. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:90.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (Supp. 2007).
220. 73 F.3d 497, 508 (2d Cir. 1996).
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A more difficult situation arises where a defendant's use is in a
commercial setting but for expressive purposes. In Mattel, Inc. v.
MCA Records, the Ninth Circuit held that, although the defendant
music company used the protected mark BARBIE in a commercial
context-namely a pop song titled "Barbie Girl"-the use was non-
commercial, because it was primarily expressive speech.221 Courts
have been willing to find parody in a commercial setting, because "[a]
dilution injunction, by contrast to a trademark injunction, will gener-
ally sweep across broad vistas of the economy. ' 222 Therefore, courts
and practitioners should reserve dilution by tarnishment for situations
where a defendant is using a famous mark in a disparaging or degrad-
ing fashion for commercial purposes, although this is not necessarily
limited to "sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal activity. '223
B. General Consuming Public Fame Analysis
The "general consuming public" fame requirement was another ma-
jor amendment to federal dilution law.224 The circuits split regarding
whether niche fame or general public fame is necessary for dilution
protection. 225 The TDRA removed the factors that influenced several
courts to apply a niche fame standard. 226 Additionally, Congress re-
moved the degree of distinctiveness from fame consideration, dis-
claiming the view that fame and distinctiveness are merely one
requirement. 227
Congress consolidated the eight FTDA factors into four.228 The
new factors, if strictly interpreted, should preserve sufficient protec-
tion for truly famous marks.229 The first factor is the "duration, ex-
tent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark
whether advertised or published by the owner or third parties." 230 Ex-
221. 296 F.3d 894. 906-07 (9th Cir. 2002).
222. Id. at 904-05. The court found that dilution law's commercial use exemption was consis-
tent with First Amendment case law. Id. at 906-07.
223. Dan-Foam A/S v. Brand Named Beds, L.L.C.. 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(quoting Hornel Foods Corp.. 73 F.3d at 507).
224. -[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the
United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner." 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (Supp. 2007).
225. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
226. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(E)-(F) (2000) (amended 2006) (considering channels of trade
and the degree of recognition in those trading areas).
227. § 1125(c)(1)(A).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2007).
229. Similar to the dilution by blurring factors, Congress intended these factors to be illustra-
tive rather than comprehensive. Id. ("[T]he court may consider all relevant factors, including
the following ....").
230. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i).
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tensive use by third parties may create a presumption that a mark is
weak, preventing a court from finding sufficient fame for dilution pro-
tection.231 Generally, courts are likely to find sufficient fame where a
plaintiff has invested extensive resources in advertising its product.232
The second factor is the "amount, volume, and geographic extent of
sales of goods or services offered under the mark. 233 Consistent with
the underlying goal of trademark dilution law, this factor seeks to pro-
tect the famous mark's economic value.234 The third factor is the "ex-
tent of actual recognition of the mark. ' 235 Under the TDRA,
recognition must extend beyond a mark owner's market segment to
satisfy the fame requirement. 236 Finally, the fourth factor considers
whether the mark was federally registered. 237
Because the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits ap-
plied a niche fame standard before the TDRA's passage, those circuits
must abandon their fame approaches in favor of a general consuming
public standard.238 Several cases finding sufficient niche fame under
the FTDA would not find the general public fame now required for
protection. 239
A general public fame standard is consistent with the policy ratio-
nales underlying dilution protection. One commentator stated that
federal dilution protection should be reserved for truly renowned
marks or "megastars. ' 240 Scholars have also argued that "[t]he more
famous the trademark, the more likely a court will find infringe-
ment. '241 Thus, the TDRA may most significantly impact those
231. See Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1210 (lst Cir.
1983) (holding that plaintiff's ASTRA mark was weakened by extensive third party use and that
defendant's use would not diminish any remaining distinctiveness).
232. See, e.g., Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding sufficient fame
where plaintiff had spent millions of dollars advertising its famous AUDI mark).
233. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2007).
234. Antidilution law is primarily concerned with protecting the economic value of a trade-
mark. Schechter, supra note 1, at 831.
235. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2007).
236. The "degree of recognition of the famous mark" is also relevant in determining dilution
by blurring. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iv).
237. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(iv). This factor is identical to the FTDA. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(H)
(2000) (amended 2006).
238. After Moseley, courts continued to apply the niche fame standard. See Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Netscape Comm'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) 800-JR-CIGAR, Inc. v.
GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2006).
239. See, e.g., Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper, Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 641 (7th Cir.
1999) (finding sufficient fame in producer's plastic basket trade dress).
240. ANNE GILSON LALONDE, CAN'T GET INTO THE DILUTION CLUB? Now WOUL) BE A
Goon TIME TO REVISIT LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 1 (LexisNexis 2007).
241. 2 GILSON, supra note 8, § 5A.01[4][b].
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
marks of sufficient fame to a nonconsumer public.242 Courts should
not deny dilution protection to a sufficiently famous mark in an indus-
trial or commercial context, merely because it is not a consumer
brand. 243 For example, in Sanofi-Aventis v. Advancis Pharmaceutical
Corp., the court held that the ADVENTIS mark was sufficiently fa-
mous, because it represented the world's third-largest pharmaceutical
company.244 This type of plaintiff warrants fame protection, even
though its mark is not a consumer brand.
C. Preemption of State Antidilution Law
As previously noted, the majority of states had antidilution laws
prior to the FTDA.245 Many states amended their statutes to match
the FTDA's "causes dilution" standard of harm, implying actual dilu-
tion. 246 After Moseley, several courts continued applying a likely dilu-
tion standard for state-based antidilution claims.247 Because the
TDRA adopted the likely dilution standard of harm, the question of
state law preemption should be reexamined.
Although many states have a likely dilution standard, the statutes
vary greatly in their terminology and, thus, are open to interpretation.
For instance, California's dilution law requires plaintiffs to demon-
strate a "[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of
the distinctive quality of a mark .. .notwithstanding the absence of
competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the
source of goods or services. ' 248 The first cases to apply the TDRA in
the Ninth Circuit have implied that the same legal standard applies to
California state dilution law.249
In contrast, other courts have questioned whether the TDRA
preempts state dilution law. The Second Circuit stated that "it is not
clear that [the New York dilution law] is coextensive with the
amended statute. ' 250 New York's dilution law requires a "[1]ikelihood
of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality
242. Id. § 5A.01[5][b].
243. Id.
244. Sanofi-Aventis v. Advancis Pharm. Corp., 453 F. Supp. 2d 834, 844 (D. Del. 2006).
245. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
246. See 765 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 1036/65(a) (West 2001); see also McNeil Nutritionals,
L.L.C. v. Heartland Sweeteners, L.L.C., No. 06-5336,2007 WL 1520101, at *17-18 (E.D. Pa. May
21, 2007) (continuing to recognize the actual dilution standard under Pennsylvania state law.
recognizing the TDRA's likely dilution standard).
247. See Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 454-55 (2d Cir. 2004).
248. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 2007).
249. See Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-1468-GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 609864, at *5
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007).
250. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765, 766 (2d Cir. 2007).
[Vol. 57:571
2008] THE CURRENT STATE OF ANTIDILUTION LAW 597
of a mark. 251 Notably, the New York law, like the California law,
does not have a separate fame requirement, although Second Circuit
courts have generally required a broad amount of fame. 252 Addition-
ally, the Southern District of Texas explicitly stated that Texas law is
not coterminous with the TDRA, finding that the state action does
not require a showing of fame.253 Moreover, Illinois's dilution law re-
quires actual dilution; however, the law only requires fame within Illi-
nois in order to receive injunctive relief, albeit limited to the state's
borders. 254
The TDRA states that federal registration is a complete defense to
a state-based dilution claim. 255 Absent this bar, state antidilution law
likely remains a viable option for claimants with less than truly famous
marks.2 56 Although the TDRA does not preclude state causes of ac-
tion, they are generally limited in scope to injunctive relief within the
state.257
D. The Retroactive Effect of the TDRA
The TDRA applies retroactively for plaintiffs who had dilution
claims prior to October 6, 2006.258 The TDRA's retroactivity, how-
ever, is limited to the forward-looking remedy of injunctive relief.259
According to section 43(c)(5), monetary damages are limited to situa-
tions in which a defendant's first use of an allegedly dilutive mark in
commerce began after October 6, 2006.260 Even with this limitation,
the TDRA's retroactivity should open the floodgates for litigants who
did not have proof of actual dilution. 261
Most courts ruling on TDRA cases have properly recognized the
retroactive likely dilution standard. In Louis Vuitton Malletier v.
Haute Diggity Dog, L. L. C., the court applied the Landsgraf two-part
test for determining a statute's retroactive effect: (1) "determining
whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's reach"; and
(2) if Congress did not express an effective date, determining if the
251. NEW YORK GEN. Bus. LAW § 360-1 (McKinney 2007).
252. See Starbucks Corp., 477 F.3d at 766.
253. Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (citing TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2002)).
254. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1036/65 (West 2001).
255. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(6) (Supp. 2007).
256. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:80 (citing various cases finding no preemption
before the TDRA's enactment).
257. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1036/65 (West 2001).
258. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(A) (Supp. 2007).
259. See id.
260. Id.
261. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:131.
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statute would impair existing rights or impose new duties inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute. 262 The Second Circuit recognized that
a federal dilution claim brought under the FTDA must be remanded
for consideration under the more plaintiff-friendly TDRA.263 The
Southern District of New York correctly stated that the FTDA actual
dilution standard is still relevant for plaintiffs seeking monetary dam-
ages for uses prior to October 6, 2006.264 However, the Ninth Circuit
incorrectly interpreted federal dilution law by continuing to apply an
actual dilution requirement for injunctive relief after October 6,
2006.265
V. IMPACT
With several changes in statutory language and its potential retroac-
tivity, the TDRA should have an immediate impact on dilution claims.
The "likely to cause" dilution standard should result in more success
for plaintiffs, especially those who can show the use of an identical
mark by a junior user. Section A examines whether the first courts to
apply the TDRA have properly interpreted its most substantial
amendments. 266 Section B explores whether dilution should be a dis-
tinctive trademark right, given the substantial amount of overlap with
infringement and dilution's similarities to publicity and moral
rights.267
A. Early Judicial Interpretations of the TDRA
In the months following the TDRA's enactment, several courts con-
sidered TDRA trademark dilution claims.268 Somewhat surprisingly,
plaintiffs only received a favorable outcome in a minority of these
cases. 269 As this Section demonstrates, courts applied various levels of
262. 464 F. Supp. 2d 495, 504 (E.D. Va. 2006) (citing Landsgraf v. USI Film Prods., Inc., 511
U.S. 244, 280 (1994)).
263. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765. 766 (2d Cir. 2007).
264. Dan-Foam A/S v. Brand Named Beds, L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 306 n.87 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
265. See Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2007) (adhering to the
actual dilution standard and finding that identical mark usage did not require any additional
circumstantial evidence).
266. See infra notes 268-300 and accompanying text.
267. See infra notes 301-315 and accompanying text.
268. Additionally, the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board first applied the antidilution law
in 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Wechsler, Opp. No. 91117739 (T.T.A.B. May 15, 2007) (finding no dilution by
blurring of opposer's GULP family of marks by registrant's GULPY mark).
269. See Dan-Foam A/S, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 325-26; Levi Strauss & Co. v. Fox Hollow Apparel
Group, L.L.C., No. C-06-3765-SC, 2007 WL 1140648 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007); Pet Silk, Inc. v.
Jackson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
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depth in their TDRA analyses, particularly regarding dilution by blur-
ring claims and the general public fame standard. This Section re-
views how courts applied the likely dilution standard in blurring and
tarnishment contexts. 270 A summary of the courts' general public
fame analyses follows. 271 Finally, this Section demonstrates the con-
tinued vitality of the identical mark presumption.272
1. Mixed Application of the "Likely to Cause" Dilution Standard
First, several courts acknowledged that the TDRA responded to
Moseley's actual dilution requirement.2 73 The courts varied in their
approaches to analyzing blurring and tarnishment claims. In Louis
Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., the Eastern District of
Virginia was the first court to apply the TDRA.274 The plaintiff,
holder of the unique LOUIS VUITTON marks, sought an injunction
against the defendant selling plush stuffed toys under parodic names,
such as "Chewy Vuiton. '275 Although the court acknowledged the
likely dilution standard and the TDRA blurring factors, it relied in-
stead on New York state antidilution standards to find no dilution by
blurring or tarnishment. 276
While Louis Vuitton did not warrant the Moseley identical mark
presumption, the court erred by failing to consider the TDRA's blur-
ring factors. The court found the defendant's products to be parodies
but did not consider whether the defendant used those parodies as a
"designation of source. '277 Although fair use is exempted from dilu-
tion liability, the exemption does not apply when a defendant uses a
diluting mark as its source indicator.278 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
270. See infra notes 273-284 and accompanying text.
271. See infra notes 285-294 and accompanying text.
272. See infra notes 295-300 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool. Corp. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 05-C-1171, 2007
WL 2875232, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2007) (recognizing that the TDRA effectively overruled
the niche fame holding from Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.2d 633, 641
(7th Cir. 1999)); Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 464 F. Supp. 2d 495, 504
(E.D. Va. 2006) ("[Tjhe dilution statute was amended by Congress to exclude the 'actual dilu-
tion' requirement in place of a 'likely dilution' one."). In fact, the Second Circuit remanded
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc. for consideration under the likely dilution stan-
dard, despite the district court's analysis of a state law dilution claim at trial. No. 01 Civ. 5981,
2005 WL 3527126 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2005), vacated and remanded, 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007).
274. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
275. Id. at 498 (also selling products such as "Chewnel #5," "Dog Perignon," and "Sniffany &
Co").
276. Id. at 505.
277. Emma Barraclough, The Dilution Debate, INTA DAILY NEWS, May 1, 2007, at 25.
278. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (Supp. 2007).
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affirmed the district court's finding of parody, despite disagreeing with
the court's analysis of dilution by blurring.279
After Louis Vuitton, other courts generally performed a more thor-
ough analysis of dilution by blurring, often requiring some type of sur-
vey evidence to support a showing of likely dilution. In Autozone,
Inc. v. Strick, the plaintiff made no showing of dilution from use of
defendant's OILZONE mark.280 In Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l, Inc.,
the plaintiff's survey evidence was inadequate to warrant summary
judgment because of a small sample size, which was not directed to-
ward the general consuming public of the United States. 281 In Century
21 Real Estate, L.L.C. v. Century Insurance Group, the court under-
took a thorough analysis of the six blurring factors, finding that the
marks were not sufficiently similar and that consumers had not made
a mental association with the defendant's CENTURY SURETY
GROUP mark.282 For the most part, these courts meticulously ana-
lyzed blurring, requiring some form of consumer survey or anecdotal
evidence consistent with Moseley's directive.
Only a handful of the TDRA cases involved dilution by tarnish-
ment. In Louis Vuitton, the court dismissed the plaintiff's tarnishment
claim, because the defendant's product was a parody and because it
was not used on an inferior product or in a demeaning manner.28 3 In
Dan-Foam A/S v. Brand Named Beds, L.L.C., the court denied defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment on its dilution by tarnishment
claim, because its gray market mattresses, sold under the TEMPUR-
PEDIC mark, contained material differences that could diminish the
famous mark's value. 28 4 Thus, the scope of the tarnishment cause of
action remains to be seen.
279. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).
280. 466 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
281. No. 2:05-CV-1468-GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 609864, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007). After
a bench trial, the court found dilution by blurring based on the following evidence: (1) NIKE's
fame prior to the first use of NIKEPAL; (2) the high degree of similarity between the marks; (3)
the inherent distinctiveness in NIKE's mark; (4) the substantially exclusive use of NIKE by the
plaintiff; (5) the high degree of recognition of NIKE; (6) the defendant's intent to create an
association; and (7) actual evidence of association based on the plaintiffs survey. Nike, Inc. v.
Nikepal Int'l, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-1468, 2007 WL 2782030 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007). Nike is per-
haps the most significant dilution finding to date, because the case clearly involved no likelihood
of confusion, yet likely dilution was found.
282. No. CIV-03-0053-PHX-SMM, 2007 WL 484555, at *14-18 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2007).
283. Louis Vuittoi Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 464 F. Supp. 2d 495,505 (E.D. Va.
2006). But see Diane Von Furstenberg Studio v. Snyder, No. 1:06-CV-1356, 2007 WL 2688184
(E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2007) (finding dilution by tarnishment based on defendant's use of identical
DVR mark, for high-quality women's apparel, on goods of "shoddy quality").
284. 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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2. Limiting Dilution Protection to Truly Famous Marks
Many of the first TDRA cases did not involve a detailed analysis of
the fame requirement, because the parties did not contest the plain-
tiff's fame. Marks such as LOUIS VUITTON, AUTOZONE, NIKE,
and CENTURY 21 would undoubtedly satisfy the general consuming
public test. Additionally, courts in the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
that the TDRA's general public fame standard overruled the niche
fame standard. 285 In Jarritos, the court denied the owner of the JAR-
RITOS mark, a soft drink manufacturer, dilution protection, because
the court stated that a mark must be "truly prominent and renowned"
to warrant dilution relief.286 The defendant used the LOS JARRITOS
mark for its restaurant.2 87 The court was not persuaded by the plain-
tiff's fame evidence, because it provided only limited documentation
of its national distribution and advertising campaign. 288
In contrast, the plaintiff in Dan-Foam presented sufficient evidence
of general public fame for its TEMPUR-PEDIC mark to survive sum-
mary judgment. 289 The plaintiff provided extensive evidence of its na-
tionwide advertising and publicity activities, including expenditures in
excess of $250 million promoting the brand.290 Tempur-Pedic also
provided evidence of sales in excess of $2 billion over a three-year
timeframe.29t Although the court considered each of the TDRA fame
factors, it stated that "neither the TDRA nor the FTDA require a
court to consider all of the statutory factors when making a determi-
nation of fame, nor do the statutes require a court to use any of the
factors listed in either version of the statute if the court finds other
factors more relevant. '292 Time will tell whether additional courts fol-
low suit in their fame analyses.
Finally, one court incorrectly interpreted the TDRA by continuing
to recognize niche fame. In Pet-Silk, Inc. v. Jackson, the Southern
District of Texas adhered to a market fame standard, finding that the
PET-SILK mark was sufficiently famous in the pet supply and dog
grooming market.293 Although Pet-Silk could have relied on Texas
285. Century 21 Real Estate, 2007 WL 484555, at *14; Jarritos, Inc. v. Los Jarritos, No. C-05-
02380-JSW, 2007 WL 1302506, at *17 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2007).
286. Jarritos, 2007 WL 1302506, at *17.
287. Id. at *1.
288. Id. at *18. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defen-
dant used the JARRITOS mark "as a trademark." Id.
289. Dan-Foam AIS, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 325.
290. Id. at 299.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. 481 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
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state antidilution law, this type of plaintiff should be ineligible for fed-
eral antidilution protection. 294
3. Continued Reliance on the Identical Mark Presumption
Among the first several contested dilution cases under the TDRA,
the majority of courts gave extensive consideration to the identical
mark presumption. In Dan-Foam, the court applied the presumption
where an unauthorized distributor was using an identical replica of
plaintiff's famous TEMPUR-PEDIC mark.295 In Pet Silk, the court
noted that, although the defendant's use of PET SILK in its domain
names was not identical, it was close enough to find dilution. 296 In
Century 21, the court found that defendant's use of CENTURY was
not substantially similar to plaintiff's CENTURY 21 mark.297 In Jar-
ritos, defendant's mark was not "identical, or nearly identical" to
plaintiff's mark, and, thus, the court found no dilution.2 98 Finally,
courts applying the pre-TDRA dilution standard for uses prior to Oc-
tober 6, 2006 also relied on the identical mark presumption to provide
circumstantial evidence of actual dilution.2 99
These cases demonstrate that, although Congress provided six non-
exhaustive factors for determining dilution by blurring, courts will
continue to rely first and foremost on the amount of similarity be-
tween the plaintiff's mark and the accused diluter's mark. It is un-
likely that Congress intended identity to be a super-factor that reigns
supreme over the other five factors. But, as these cases demonstrate,
a plaintiff who cannot prove close proximity of his mark to the defen-
dant's mark will not succeed on a federal dilution claim.300
294. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2002) (articulating no fame require-
ment). See also World Triathlon Corp. v. Dawn Syndicated Prods., No. 08:05-CV-983-T-27EAJ,
2007 WL 2875456 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2007) (finding that plaintiff's IRONMAN mark was not
sufficiently famous to warrant protection because of extensive third-party use of the mark).
295. 500 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
296. 481 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
297. Century 21 Real Estate, L.L.C. v. Century Ins. Group, No. CIV-03-0053-PHX-SMM,
2007 WL 484555, at *15 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2007).
298. Jarritos, Inc. v. Los Jarritos, No. C-05-02380-JSW, 2007 WL 1302506, at *17 (N.D. Cal.
May 2, 2007).
299. See, e.g., Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 496 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying plaintiff's
summary judgment motion because there was a question of fact whether HOT RIGZ mark was
nearly identical to HOT WHEELS); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Van Dyke Liquor Mkt., Inc., 471
F. Supp. 2d 822, 833 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (finding actual dilution where defendant retailer used a
counterfeit identical mark on tobacco products).
300. Professor McCarthy has stated that when a famous mark is fanciful and coined, the use of
an identical mark is strong evidence of association. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:116. But
when a famous mark is not coined, no presumption of dilution should follow from an identical
mark unless the senior user can prove association via some kind of evidence, such as a survey.
Id.
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B. Should Dilution Be a Trademark Right?
In addition to varied court interpretations of the TDRA, there has
been considerable debate concerning whether dilution should be a
separate actionable right for mark owners. Because antidilution law,
unlike infringement, does not require consumer confusion, trademark
dilution is more difficult to justify, given the harsh remedy of injunc-
tive relief. Congress stated that dilution law potentially offers more
protection for a famous mark holder than infringement law. 30 1 This
danger is especially prominent under the TDRA, with its likely dilu-
tion evidentiary requirement.
Historically, courts have been reluctant to embrace dilution by blur-
ring, because the injury is subtle compared to tarnishment. 30 2 Blur-
ring has been described as "death by a thousand cuts" or "being stung
by a hundred bees. ' 30 3 In many blurring cases, it is difficult to identify
a particularized harm to the plaintiff mark holder.30 4 Furthermore, it
is often difficult to distinguish dilution from infringement, especially
when the TDRA's six-factor blurring test substantially overlaps with
trademark infringement's likelihood of confusion test.305
Additionally, it is difficult to craft an evidentiary rule to guide plain-
tiffs. In Moseley, the Court opined that, in the absence of identical
marks, a plaintiff could demonstrate circumstantial evidence by point-
ing to consumer survey data or other empirical evidence. 30 6 Courts
have struggled to determine what type of survey could be crafted to
measure blurring without venturing into a confusion analysis.307
One commentator stated that trademark dilution is better charac-
terized as a corporate right of publicity than an extension of trade-
mark protection. 30 8  The right of publicity is not universally
recognized, but protection is generally limited to well-known identi-
ties and circumstances in which a defendant's action creates an unau-
301. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
302. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:100.
303. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (state-
ment of Rep. Howard L. Berman); Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:94).
304. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:100.
305. A plaintiff's success or failure in a dilution claim commonly mirrors his success or failure
in an infringement claim.
306. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003).
307. Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 535 (7th Cir. 2003) ("We are not sure what
question could be put to consumers that would elicit a meaningful answer .... ").
308. See Kristine Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Trademark Dilution
Legislation, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 349 (1998).
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thorized association between the famous identity and a product.30 9
This right is concerned primarily with the economic interests of the
famous person or his heirs, similar to dilution's goal of protecting a
famous mark holder's economic goodwill. 310 Other commentators, in-
cluding Professor McCarthy, have expressed doubt that the right of
publicity should be extended beyond natural persons.31' Neverthe-
less, it is reasonable to believe that truly unique marks could be ade-
quately protected under a corporate right of publicity.
Dilution by tarnishment, more so than dilution by blurring, involves
a direct injury to the famous mark holder's well-being. Tarnishment
coverage is somewhat analogous to copyright law's moral rights doc-
trine.312 Moral rights protection extends beyond economic incentives
and protects moral interests, such as the right to claim authorship. 31 3
The moral right most comparable to tarnishment is the right "to pre-
vent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification" of a
qualifying work that would blemish the honor or reputation of the
author.314 An author's honor or reputation shares many qualities with
a trademark owner's goodwill. Both doctrines protect against unau-
thorized alterations; however, tarnishment is primarily concerned with
the trademark holder's economic interests, while moral rights law is
concerned with the artist's noneconomic interests. Despite these dif-
ferences, moral rights protection shares many of the same characteris-
tics with dilution by tarnishment.31 5
While related doctrines, such as the right of publicity and moral
rights, have similarities to dilution protection, mark owners are best
served by a distinct cause of action for the protection of truly famous
trademarks. Dilution by blurring, particularly, should be narrowly
construed in uniformity with infringement.
309. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
310. Schechter, supra note 1, at 831.
311. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of
Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129 (1995).
312. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). International law offers a much broader scope of moral
rights coverage. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Article
6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, available at http://www.wipo.inttreaties/en/ipfbernelpdf/trtdocs-woOOl.pdf
(last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
313. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1).
314. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
315. See generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimen-
sion of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act is undoubtedly a positive
step for antidilution law. Congress recognized the major problems
with the FFDA and Moseley and appropriately resolved the most con-
tentious issues. The TDRA should result in a more uniform applica-
tion of antidilution law and thus minimize forum shopping.
Moreover, the likely dilution and general fame standards are consis-
tent with the core purpose of trademark dilution protection-protect-
ing goodwill for unique trademark holders. Additionally, the clearly
defined causes of action for blurring and tarnishment should ensure
adequate protection for famous mark holders, especially those who
can take advantage of the identical mark presumption.
The enhanced protections for mark owners, if liberally applied,
could destroy the balance of rights for the public, including both com-
petitors and consumers. Professor McCarthy stated that "the present
state of antidilution law has been bloated far out of proportion to its
original purpose and intent.1316 Courts must protect nominative and
descriptive fair uses, along with parodies and satires, from dilution lia-
bility. The expanded exemptions for these fair uses should prevent a
chilling effect on expressive, noncommercial speech, while simultane-
ously allowing famous mark owners to attack commercial uses that
have no expressive value. Therefore, courts must strictly interpret the
TDRA to ensure that the law is applied properly for unique mark
owners.
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